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BOOK REVIEWS
WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW IN
NORTH CAROLINA.
Revised edition by Patrick K. Hetrick.t Charlottesville, Virginia: The Michie
Company, 1981. Pp. viii, 650. $60.00.
REVIEWED BY RONALD C. LINK*
A revision of a standard reference should be evaluated in light of two
considerations. The first is whether the reviser's purposes were well-chosen.
The second is whether the reviser accomplished his goals. Professor Hetrick's
revised edition of Webster's Real Estate Law in North Carolina1 succeeds on
both of these counts. It is an excellent revision of an excellent book.
In the decade since its publication in 1971, the late Professor Webster's
book has established itself as the standard reference on questions of real estate
law in North Carolina. Webster's purpose was to review for practicing law-
yers and law students the fundamental principles of North Carolina real prop-
erty law and he succeeded admirably. The book was well conceived,
thoroughly researched, and clearly written. It should be noted that Webster
did not propose to cover every possible aspect of North Carolina property law.
He focused on present estates, acquisition and transfer of ownership, and title
examination, eschewing the Torrens System as not widely used and condomin-
iums as not yet timely. Webster also exempted the subject of future interests,
2
intending a second volume on that subject as a complement to the original
book. His untimely death defeated that project, and law book publishers gen-
erally, believing that the subject would have limited commercial appeal, have
not commissioned a book on the North Carolina law of future interests.
Webster's approach to the materials was to state the law as he found it,
not as he would have preferred it to be. With only a few exceptions,3 Webster
displayed massive self-restraint in refusing to succumb to the academic temp-
tation to parse, analyze, explicate, synthesize, theorize and criticize. This
largely descriptive approach was generally a strength and only occasionally a
t Professor of Law, Campbell University.
t Professor of Law, The University of North Carolina.
1. 1 J. Webster, Real Estate Law in North Carolina: Possessory Estates and Present Inter-
ests in Real Property (1971).
2. Some future interests topics inevitably crept into the discussion of present estates. For
example, the Rule in Shelley's Case surfaced in the discussion of grants to the heirs of a living
tperson, 1 J. Webster, supra note 2, § 152, and the Rule Against Perpetuities appeared in connec-
on with various defeasible fees and the interests associated with them. Id. §§ 41, 405.
3. See, e.g., the criticism of Reed v. Elmore, 246 N.C. 221, 98 S.E.2d 360 (1957), which held
that a purchaser must examine all out conveyances of prior holders of record title, not just those
conveyances of the parcel in question. I J. Webster, supra note 2, § 402.
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weakness. It was a strength by enabling concise and clear treatment of a huge
subject; its only limitation was in not giving the practitioner or litigator some
hints about which rules were archaic or misguided.4 Curbstone opinions,
however, are easy to come by, and North Carolina courts seem not too inter-
ested in professorial innovations.
5
Professor Hetrick describes his revision as a general updating of existing
footnotes and text, as well as an undertaking of new coverage of such topics as
options, real estate brokers, residential tenancies, mechanics' liens, implied
warranties, and deceptive-practices legislation.6 The threshold question is
whether a new edition was due, and the answer definitely is in the affirmative.
At a cautious estimate of fifty real property cases per year, more than five
hundred decisions have been reported in the decade since Webster was pub-
lished. Some of these decisions answered previously unresolved questions or
gave new answers to old questions: Does a builder-vendor impliedly warrant
habitability of a dwelling?7 Does sale of property subject to a restrictive cove-
nant limiting use to single-family residential purposes imply a warranty that
the property is usable for such purposes?8 Does existence of an ordinance
preventing a purchaser's intended use of commercial property constitute a
breach of the covenant against encumbrances?9 Does extension of a lease con-
taining an option to purchase also extend the option? 10 Does a due-on-sale
4. In forums more appropriate for theoretical examination, Webster has left a major body of
work. See, e.g., his North Carolina Law Review series on the quest for clear land titles: Webster,
Doubt Reduction Through Conveyancing Reform-More Suggestions in the Quest for Clear
Land Titles, 46 N.C.L. Rev. 284 (1968); Webster, Toward Greater Marketability of Land Titles-
Remedying the Defective Acknowledgment Syndrome, 46 N.C.L. Rev. 56 (1967); Webster, A
Relic North Carolina Can Do Without-The Rule in Shelley's Case, 45 N.C.L. Rev. 3 (1966);
Webster, The Quest for Clear Land Titles-Making Land Title Searches Shorter and Surer in
North Carolina Via Marketable Title Legislation, 44 N.C.L. Rev. 89 (1965); Webster, The Quest
for Clear Land Titles-Whither Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry?, 42 N.C.L. Rev. 807
(1964).
5. But see Justice Morris' eminently sensible opinion in Rodin v. Merritt, 48 N.C. App. 64,
268 S.E.2d 539 (1980), holding that an option to purchase conditioned upon the purchaser's ability
to cause the property to be rezoned did not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. Justice Morris
reasoned that the parties contemplated performance of the contract within a reasonable time not
greater than 21 years. See North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Carpenter, 280 N.C. 705, 707, 187 S.E.2d
5, 7 (1972):
In cases from other jurisdictions, judges-some text writers joining them-have ad-
vanced an interesting theory, somewhat professional in its approach, contending that
stock splits and stock dividends occurring after the execution of a will are merely
changes in form and not in substance and should go to the legatee even though they were
declared and delivered to the testator during his lifetime. In short, they contend in such
case, the will should speak as of the date of its execution rather than the date of the
testator's death. The argument is not at peace either with our statute or our decided
cases.
6. J. Webster, Webster's Real Estate Law in North Carolina v (P. Hetrick rev. 1981) [herein-
after cited as Hetrick].
7. Yes. Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d 776 (1974).
8. Yes. Hinson v. Jefferson, 287 N.C. 422, 215 S.E.2d 102 (1975), which is apparently the
only case of its kind in the United States.
9. No. Marriott Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Capitol Funds, Inc., 288 N.C. 122, 217 S.E.2d 551
(1975). An existing violation of the ordinance does breach the covenant. Wilcox v. Pioneer
Homes, Inc., 41 N.C. App. 140, 254 S.E.2d 214 (1979).
10. Yes, if the parties so intended. Davis v. McRee, 299 N.C. 498, 263 S.E.2d 604 (1980).
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clause constitute an invalid restraint on alienation?11 Does the revised North
Carolina procedure for foreclosure under power of sale constitute a depriva-
tion of property without due process?' 2 Does the anti-deficiency statute pre-
vent a purchase-money mortgagee from abandoning the security and suing on
the note? 13 Does a landowner have an unqualified right to fend off surface
waters without regard to the consequences to other landowners? 14 Does a
family care home violate a covenant restricting use to single-family dwell-
ings?' 5 Does a right of first refusal extending in duration to the maximum
period of the Rule Against Perpetuities constitute an invalid restraint upon
alienation?' 6 Does historic preservation constitute a valid purpose of zon-
ing?' 7 Does the holder of an unrecorded option to purchase take priority over
subsequent recorded purchasers?18 Does a creditor's suit to set aside an alleg-
edly fraudulent conveyance constitute an action affecting title to real property
within the lispendens statute?' 9
Furthermore, the North Carolina General Assembly has been actively
changing the real estate practice in the last decade. New or amended compre-
hensive laws include the Residential Rental Agreements Act,20 amendments to
the power of sale foreclosure statutes,21 amendments to the mechanics' lien
laws,22 the Administration of Decedents' Estates Act,23 the Real Property
Marketable Title Act,24 and the Eminent Domain Act.2 5 Also significant were
11. No. Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976).
12. Apparently not. See Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
13. Yes. Ross Realty Co. v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 296 N.C. 366, 250 S.E. 2d 271
(1979). The statute, however, does not apply when the security is a leasehold interest, a chattel
real. Kavanau Real Estate Trust v. Debnam, 299 N.C. 510, 263 S.E.2d 595 (1980).
14. No. Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 236 S.E.2d 787 (1977).
15. No. J.T. Hobby & Son, Inc. v. Family Homes, Inc., 302 N.C. 64, 274 S.E.2d 174 (1981).
See this Survey, Property Law, at 1431.
16. No. Smith v. Mitchell, 301 N.C. 58, 269 S.E.2d 608 (1980).
17. Yes. A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 298 N.C. 207, 258 S.E.2d 444 (1979). The validity
of purely aesthetic zoning is still an open question. See State v. Jones, 53 N.C. App. 466, 281
S.E.2d 91 (1981) (aesthetics alone may be a valid zoning purpose); County of Cumberland v.
Eastern Fed. Corp., 48 N.C. App. 518, 269 S.E.2d 672 (dictum that aesthetics alone may justify a
sign ordinance), cert. denied, 301 N.C. 527, 273 S.E.2d 453 (1980).
18. Yes. Lawing v. Jaynes, 285 N.C. 418, 206 S.E. 2d 162 (1974). G.S. 47-18, the Conner
Act, was amended after Lawing to bring options within the operation of the Act. Law of June 9,
1975, ch. 507, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 527 (effective October 1, 1975).
19. Yes. North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Evans, 296 N.C. 374, 250 S.E.2d 231 (1979).
20. Law of June 28, 1977, ch. 790, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1006 (codified as amended
at N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 42-38 to -44 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
21. Law of June 6, 1975, ch. 492, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 509 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 45-21.9, -21.16, -21.16A, -21.17, -21.21, -21.29, -21.33, -21.45 (1976)).
22. Law of June 23, 1975, ch. 715, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 940 (codified as amended
at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 44A-7(1), -8 (1976)); Law of May 12, 1977, ch. 369, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st
Sess. 372 (codified as amended at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 44A-12(c) (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1981)); Law of
July 1, 1977, ch. 883, 1977 N.C. Seas. Laws, Ist Sess. 1209 (codified as amended at N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 44A-13(c) (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1981)).
23. Law of April 12,1974, ch. 1329, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 629 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 28A-1-1 to -26-9 (1976)).
24. Law of April 23, 1973, ch. 255, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 240 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 47B-1 to -9 (1976)).
25. Law of July 10, 1981, ch. 919, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Seas. 1382 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 40A-1 to -69 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
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changes or additions to certain specific statutes: G.S. 52-10, a new sex-neutral
statute regarding privy examinations for conveyances from one spouse to the
other,26 G.S. 43-63 and 43-64, providing that the mere designation of a record
owner as "trustee" does not limit his power to convey a good title;27 G.S. 45-
36.3, requiring the holder of a recently-cancelled mortgage to acknowledge
satisfaction within 60 days; 28 G.S. 1-38(b) and (c), the color of title amend-
ment facilitating proof of possession under known and visible lines and
boundaries; 29 various Machinery Act amendments, including G.S. 105-361,
requiring the tax collector to furnish a written certificate of taxes due;30 and
G.S. 58-132, providing that title insurance may be issued only upon the opin-
ion of a licensed attorney, not upon that of an employee of the company.
3 1
Clearly the onslaught of new laws warranted a revised edition of Webster.
Hetrick's basic approach is to update the original Webster edition and to
add certain new topics. Hetrick follows Webster's original organization, re-
taining the original twenty-five chapters and adding two chapters on real es-
tate brokerage and the Marketable Title Act.32 The only deletions are of
materials that have been superseded by new cases or statutes. Generally, He-
trick updates the earlier edition by adding discrete sentences or paragraphs at
the beginning or end of a Webster paragraph or section, so as not to interrupt
the flow of Webster's words, and this unobtrusive technique works very well.
33
Hetrick has promoted some of Webster's subsections to separate sections,
34
and has elevated some of Webster's footnotes to text.35 These changes felici-
26. Law of May 13, 1977, ch. 375, §2, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 375 (codified as
amended at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52-10 (Cur. Supp. 1981)).
27. Law of April 29, 1975, ch. 181, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 142 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 43-63, -64 (1976)).
28. Law of May 29, 1979, ch. 681, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 724 (codified as amended at
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-36.3 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
29. Law of April 20, 1973, ch. 250, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 236; Law of May 5, 1975,
ch. 207, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 190 (codified as amended at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-38(b)(c)
(Cum. Supp. 1981)).
30. Law of May 18, 1973, ch. 604, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 914 (codified as amended at
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-361 (1979)).
31. Law of April 3, 1973, ch. 128, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 107 (codified as amended at
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-132 (1975)).
32. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 47B-1 to -9 (1976).
33. By the time of subsequent editions, the law may have changed enough to call for sustan-
tial rewriting, but the basic law as stated by Webster remains accurate in 1982. Hetrick occasion-
ally rewrites a Webster section, but these changes represent an improvement of the original
edition. The only area in which substantial revision might have been justified is in the discussion
of leases in Chapter 12, where much of the discussion is qualified by provisos that the Residential
Rental Agreements Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 42-38 to -44 (1976), is assumed not to apply. The new
Act is discussed separately in Chapter 6, Non-Freehold Estates, Hetrick §§ 65-71, but may have
been integrated into Chapter 12 on Leases.
As did Webster, Hetrick resists the temptation to editorialize, despite such ripe topics as the
rule that a mistaken belief that one is the true owner negates adverse possession, Hetrick § 293,
and a set of confused cases on the difficult issue of covenants running with the land. Hetrick
§ 387. See, e.g., Raintree Corp. v. Rowe, 38 N.C. App. 664, 248 S.E.2d 904 (1978).
34. E.g., Hetrick § 292 (tacking in adverse possession, formerly at I J. Webster, supra note 2,
§ 262(b)); Hetrick § 301 (adverse possession by tenants in common, formerly at 1 J. Webster,
supra note 2, § 260(b)).
35. E.g., Hetrick §§ 465-73 (types of private deeds, formerly at I J. Webster, supra note 2,
§§ 382(a)-(i)).
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tously serve to emphasize important materials.
From a bewildering barrage of appellate cases, Hetrick generally has se-
lected the most important cases, given them proper emphasis, and put them in
the right places. 36 New cases emphasized in the text either deal with impor-
tant doctrinal matters37 or contain clear statements of general principles.38
One particular feature helpful to the researcher is that the revised edition cites
federal court cases dealing with North Carolina property issues.39 Neither the
original Webster edition nor the Hetrick revision includes a table of cases or
statutes; such a feature would be helpful, albeit lengthy.4° In addition, readers
will need to be alert for court of appeals decisions reversed in the inevitable
gap between writing and publication of the book.41
Hetrick's incorporation of new statutes is equally sensitive. He displays a
good sense of relevance in selecting those statutes most important to the prac-
ticing bar.42 For example, while adding a chapter on the new Marketable
Title Act,43 Hetrick does not fail to note in a separate textual section 4 the
contemporaneous passage of the color of title amendment that facilitates proof
of adverse possession in overcoming the onerous requirements of Mobley v.
Griffin .a This seemingly minor amendment may prove to be of more practi-
36. But see Hetrick § 197 n.196 (Garrison v. Blakeney, 37 N.C. App. 73, 246 S.E.2d 144, cert.
denied, 295 N.C. 646, 248 S.E.2d 251 (1978), the infamous "seal case," which caused so much
consternation, might have deserved more attention).
37. See, e.g., Hetrick § 504.
38. See, e.g., Hetrick § 307.
39. E.g., Hetrick §§ 352 n.28, 356 n.79. The revised edition also cites pertinent law review
articles, although the listings are not always exhaustive. See, e.g., Hetrick § 149. (Omissions in-
elude Whitman, Transferring North Carolina Real Estate (pts. I & 2), 49 N.C.L. Rev. 413 (1971),
49 N.C.L. Rev. 593 (1971); Note, The Implied Warranty of Habitability in North Carolina Revis-
ited, 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1055 (1980)); Hetrick § 278 (Note, Mortgages-Use of Due on Sale Clause by
a Lender is Not a Restraint on Alienation in North Carolina, 55 N.C.L. Rev. 310 (1977).
40. Section 390 of the text states the court of appeals holding in Smith v. Mitchell, 44 N.C.
App. 474, 261 S.E.2d 231 (1980), an important case on the validity of preemptions, while section
504 states the supreme court holding in the same case, 301 N.C. 58, 269 S.E.2d 608 (1980), revers-
ing the court of appeals. This result might have been avoided by a table of cases. The index is
revised, although perhaps not with as many cross references as one might like. For example, a
search for Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976), the
leading due-on-sale clause case treated in § 278 of the text, would find no heading leading to it
under due-on-sale clauses or restraints on alienation. It is indexed under "Mortgages and Deeds
of Trust-Foreclosure-Due-On-Sale Clause."
Another useful feature, at the price of only a few additional pages, would be a detailed table
of contents. The current table of contents lists only the chapter headings, and the reader has to
turn to the first page of each chapter to find the titles of the sections in the chapter.
41. E.g.,J. T. Hobby & Son, Inc. v. Family Homes, Inc., 302 N.C. 64, 274 S.E.2d 174 (1981),
rev'g 46 N.C. App. 231, 266 S.E.2d 32 (1980) (discussed at Hetrick § 388 nn.55 & 56). The
supreme court's decision that a family care home does not violate a single-family residential cove-
nant appears to have been codified in G.S. 168-20 to -23. Law of June 12, 1981, ch. 565, 1981 N.C.
Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 834.
42. E.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 43-63, -64 (1976) (Hetrick § 174). See generally notes 21-32 and
accompanying text supra.
43. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 47B-1 to -9 (1976). In the new chapter on the Marketable Title Act,
Hetrick quotes the full text of the Act. More productive use of space might have been made by
giving examples of the operation of the Act from the literature, as was done in Hetrick § 508 n.6.
See also examples in the articles cited in Hetrick § 508 nn.5 & 7.
44. Hetrick § 295.
45. 104 N.C. 112, 10 S.E. 142 (1889).
1982] 1489
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
cal impact than the Marketable Title Act.46 Also, the author has been careful
to note the effective date of new legislation; this feature should be especially
helpful to title examiners.
The new topics added to the revised addition are well-chosen. Options,
which are fairly common arrangements, are treated at length. While often the
lawyer is not consulted when his client lists with a broker, all too often the
lawyer is involved if the listing sours. Likewise, the national evolution in
landlord-tenant rights and duties has begun to ippear in North Carolina cases
and statutes. Mechanics' lien laws and foreclosure procedures are of tremen-
dous practical importance to lawyers, title insurers, and lenders, as well as
purchasers. In addition to their obvious uses, the implied warranty cases are
important for counselling builders. Deceptive-practices legislation presents
new possibilities to the litigator.47 All of these developments are treated in the
revised edition. With the pending draft of a second-generation condominium
law, it made sense to withhold treatment of that subject, although it should be
noted that the revised Eminent Domain Act was passed after the manuscript
was prepared.
48
Two areas deserve particular emphasis. The materials on water rights are
substantially rewritten.49 Sections 358 and 359 include an extraordinarily
helpful summary of federal and state statutes affecting water use and rights;
similar sections for statutes affecting land use would be a good addition to the
next edition. Special note should also be taken of Webster's materials on title
examination: these are very helpful, and Hetrick has included them more or
less intact,50 with occasional updating to reflect changes in practice. 5'
The only major area not covered is that of professional responsibility,
including ethical duties and malpractice considerations. In the last decade,
this general area has evolved from an abstract field of academic speculation to
46. See Everett, Marketable Title Act, in Institute on Real Estate Practice-Vital New Devel-
opments IV-16 to -26 (N.C. Bar Ass'n Found. 1973).
47. Recent cases evidence increasing use of the unfair trade practices statute in the real estate
context. By complaining under G.S. 75-1.1 the plaintiff hopes to secure treble damages under
G.S. 75-16 and attorney's fees under G.S. 75-16.1. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 75-1.1, -16, -16.1 (1981).
See, e.g., Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981) (action against a landlord); Stone
v. Paradise Park Homes, Inc., 37 N.C. App. 97, 245 S.E.2d 801, review denied, 295 N.C. 653, 248
S.E.2d 257 (1978) (suit against a builder). The use of these theories seems to be growing, but the
unfair trade cases apparently are not treated in the revised edition. See generally Aycock, North
Carolina Law on Antitrust and Consumer Protection, 60 N.C.L. Rev. 207 (1982).
48. Law of July 10, 1981, ch. 919, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1382 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 40A-1 to -69 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
49. Hetrick §§ 349, 353, 356-59.
50. Hetrick chs. 21-27. Hetrick has accomplished his revision with a manageable increase in
length. Webster's edition was 628 pages and the Hetrick revision is 650 pages. The typeface and
margins, however, are reduced in the new edition, yielding about 6 or 7 more lines per page, so the
true length is more than 22 pages beyond the original.
51. E.g., §§ 461, 465 n.38, 510. The North Carolina Bar Association (N.C.B.A.) has adopted
and promulgated a widely-accepted set of standard forms for residential real estate transactions.
These forms, especially No. I (Opinion on Title) and No. 2 (Offer to Purchase and Contract), may
profitably have been incorporated into the revised edition. Hetrick continues the Webster usage
of the term "certificate of title" rather than "opinion on title." Many attorneys have gravitated
toward the "opinion" usage, in order to avoid any implication that the attorney is guaranteeing
the quality of the title. N.C.B.A. Form No. 1 uses the term "opinion on title."
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a set of definite issues'affecting the daily practice of law. It is perhaps no
coincidence that the first major North Carolina attorney malpractice case
arose in a real estate context,52 where the relationships and duties of the par-
ties are often blurred. Subsequent cases on alleged malpractice also include
several that involve property attorneys.5 3 The North Carolina State Bar, in
CPR 100,54 has attempted to answer the question of whom the lawyer repre-
sents in a single-family residential transaction; discussion continues over the
wisdom of CPR 100, but it has major implications for the closing attorney.
Debate boils over such questions as whether the attorney should attend the
closing55 and when the closing attorney should disburse funds or release the
deed.56 A North Carolina statute attempts to prohibit kickbacks in connection
with the issuance of title insurance,57 but it has been alleged that certain com-
panies have taken advantage of a proviso in the statute58 to funnel payments
to favored attorneys. The use of freelance paralegals raises question of ethics,
malpractice, and the structure of the real estate practice;59 and a State Bar
interpretation of G.S. 84-2.1 defining the practice of law is imminent.6 0 These
and other issues suggest the value of an organized and widely disseminated
treatment of the lawyer's role in the real estate transaction.
52. Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Holt, 36 N.C. App. 284, 244 S.E.2d 177 (1978) (a case of first
impression on whether liability of an attorney is grounded in contract or in tort).
53. E.g., United Leasing Corp. v. Miller, 45 N.C. App. 400, 263 S.E.2d 313, cert. denied, 300
N.C. 374, 267 S.E.2d 685 (1980) (under certain circumstances a third person not in privity may sue
attorney in negligence).
54. 8 N.C. St. B. Q., Apr. 15, 1977, at 81.
55. See M4elvin, Closings, in Institute on Real Estate Practice-Vital New Developments VII-
2 to -5 (N.C. Bar Ass'n Found. 1973).
56. See generally Whitman, Transferring North Carolina Real Estate: How the Present Sys-
tem Functions (pt. 1), 49 N.C.L. Rev. 413, 462-67 (1971).
57. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-135.1 (1975).
58. "No persons or entity shall be in violation of this section solely by reason of ownership of
stock in a bona fide title insurance company, agency, or agent." Id. § 58-135.1(c).
59. If a freelance paralegal does not engage in the unauthorized practice of law when he
furnishes a title report to an attorney, so the argument runs, how is it an unauthorized practice for
him to furnish the report to a non-lawyer? And if he may furnish the report to a non-lawyer, may
not that non-lawyer be the purchaser or a lender who will make use of the report, potentially
bypassing the attorney's opinion?
60. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 84-2.1 (1981): "The phrase 'practice of law' as used in this Chapter is
defined to be performing any legal service for any other person, firm or corporation, with or
without compensation, specifically including. . . abstracting or passing upon titles. . . ;" see 7
N.C. St. B. Newsletter 1 (1982).
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Revised fourth edition by Robert E. Lee.t Charlottesville, Virginia: The
Michie Company, 1979-81. 4 Vols.
REVIEWED BY SALLY BURNETr SHARP*
The recent publication of the revised fourth edition of Professor Robert
E. Lee's Family Law in North Carolina, is a welcome event for students and
practitioners of domestic law in this state.' The third edition of the multi-
volume treatise had long been the standard and indeed virtually the only ma-
jor work in the field. It had not, however, been revised since 1964 and had
therefore become increasingly less useful. The new edition, now expanded
from three to four volumes, will once again become a valuable reference tool.
Not surprisingly, the revised edition perpetuates most of the strengths and
weaknesses of its predecessor. Fortunately, its strengths are many. It is, first
of all, well organized and easy to use, its basic format and structure unchanged
from the previous edition. Volumes 1 and 2 center, as before, largely on issues
involving husband and wife, including courtship, marriage and divorce.
Volumes 3 and 4 deal with issues affecting children, including such diverse
topics as custody, juvenile courts, and tort immunity. Most major topics in-
clude an interesting, and otherwise virtually unavailable, discussion of the his-
tory of various aspects of North Carolina domestic law. Professor Lee's
treatment of the often confusing procedural aspects of divorce continues to be
useful.
2
The extent to which chapters or topics have been revised or expanded
varies considerably. Occasionally there appears to be a considerable amount
of old wine in new bottles. For instance, the chapters dealing with acts prior to
marriage and annulments have remained virtually unchanged, both in terms
of text and documentation. A few chapters have been updated merely by the
addition of more current footnotes.3 On the other hand, several chapters have
been extensively revised and rewritten, notably those covering the critical ar-
eas of alimony and custody. In addition, volume 4 contains an interesting and
wholly new chapter titled "Miscellaneous Laws Relating to Children", which
treats issues such as abortion, contraception, sterilization and surrogate
motherhood.
4
t Dean and Professor of Law Emeritus, Wake Forest University.
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
1. R. Lee, Family Law in North Carolina (4th ed. 1979-81).
2. Chapter 5 is devoted entirely to procedural problems of divorce. It is extremely useful.
Other procedural issues are similarly well discussed throughout the treatise.
3. Chapter 14, for example, dealing with Support and Family Expenses, is virtually identi-
cal to that of the third edition, except for some minor footnote additions. Chapters 7, 8, 9 and 13
are also changed only slightly.
4. In a remarkable, and unusual, excess of egalitarianism, Professor Lee comments in this
chapter that: "It is a rather curious turn of circumstances when a minor child who is totally
BOOK REVIEW-FAMILY LAW
More often, new developments are covered by the addition of new sec-
tions within existing chapters. There are, for instance, new sections on ali-
mony, custody, antenuptial agreements, parent locator services, recognition of
custody judgments, changing life styles and tort immunity, to name only a few.
It is also gratifying to note that the new edition includes some discussion of
most of the more significant uniform acts.5
In general, however, the major value of the revised edition lies in its me-
ticulous incorporation, in one fashion or another, of the formidable statutory
and case law changes that have occurred in North Carolina in recent years.6
These revisions reflect a profound appreciation of and familiarity with the
complexities of North Carolina domestic law. In some instances, of course,
major changes have occurred since publication of the new edition.7 And it is
particularly unfortunate that legislation providing for equitable distribution of
property upon divorce was not passed prior to publication of this edition.8
Nonetheless, the treatise is a valuable resource for the established family law
attorney, and an invaluable one for those with less expertise in the area.
In two major respects, however, the new edition is a disappointment.
First, there are several instances in which the significance or ramifications of
recent developments could profitably have been explored much more fully. In
Wheeler v. Wheeler,9 for example, the North Carolina Supreme Court held for
the first time that support and other provisions in separation agreements might
be dependent covenants.10 The implications of this holding are considerably
significant, yet the case is noted, in a different context, only briefly." Simi-
larly, the volumes continue to contain quotations, often several pages in
length, from a significant case; the cases themselves, however, receive little
independent analysis. 12 Without such analysis the treatment of a confusing
incapable of giving legal consent for sexual intercourse,. . can have an abortion without consent
of his or her parents." 4 R. Lee, supra note 1, at 74.
5. The discussion of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 52A-I to -32 (Cum. Supp. 1981), is particularly useful and well done. 2 R. Lee, supra note 1, at
337-66.
6. Many of the sections of the treatise that are not devoted to North Carolina law are con-
siderably less valuable. In one instance, for example, a 1932 source is cited for a list of jurisdic-
tions granting limited divorces. 1 R. Lee, supra note 1, at 184.
7. The father is, for instance, no longer primarily responsible for support of minor children
in North Carolina. The recent amendment to G.S. 50-13.4 therefore renders inaccurate the state-
ment at 2 R. Lee, supra note 1, at 10, to the contrary. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4 (Cum. Supp.
1981). Likewise, G.S. 50-1 l(c) has been amended, so that the discussion at 2 R. Lee, supra note 1,
at 151-52, to the effect that a plaintiff dependent spouse could not seek both alimony and a divorce
under the one year separation statute, is now incorrect. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-11(c) (Cum.
Supp. 1981).
8. G.S. 50-20, clearly the most significant development in North Carolina family law in
many years, did not become effective until October 1, 1981. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20 (Cum. Supp.
1981). The lack of any discussion of equitable distribution will undoubtedly constitute the most
serious deficiency in Professor Lee's treatise. Presumably, however, discussion of the new act will
also constitute a major portion of the first of the supplementary pocket parts planned for the
study.
9. 299 N.C. 633, 263 S.E.2d 763 (1980).
10. Id. at 642, 263 S.E.2d at 768.
11. 3 R. Lee, supra note 1, at 37 n.102.
12. See, e.g., the discussion of Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 136 S.E.2d 240( 1964), at 2 R. Lee,
1982] 1493
NORTH CAROLINA LW REVIEW
topic, such as incorporation of divorce agreements by decrees, is considerably
weakened. New statutory developments are occasionally treated in the same
fashion.
13
Ironically, the treatise combines analytical deficiency with editorial ex-
cess. Good revisions of standard works should encompass exclusions as well
as inclusions, and Professor Lee has excluded very little commentary from his
previous edition. This is unfortunate in many respects. The author's specula-
tions as to the causes, for instance, of rising divorce rates, diminishes to some
degree the academic objectivity and professionalism that readers expect from
such a study.14 His comments on other matters might be offensive to many
readers. 15
Despite these flaws, however, North Carolina Family Law remains the sin-
gle most useful tool for the practitioner of this state. It is, in all instances, an
invaluable starting point for inquiry into any area of North Carolina domestic
law. In many instances, it is considerably more.
supra note I, at 221-224; and of Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 179 S.E.2d 697 (1971), at 2 R. Lee,
supra note 1, at 478-79. Although Bunn may reasonably be said to speak for itself, Link is a
complex and important new case which deserves, but does not receive, considerable discussion.
The same is true with the critical new case of Moore v. Moore, 297 N.C. 14, 252 S.E.2d 732 (1979),
quoted in full at 2 R. Lee, supra note 1, at 527-531.
13. See, e.g., the brief treatment of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B (Cum. Supp. 1981) (domestic vio-
lence) reprinted at 2 R. Lee, supra note 1, at 603-07, and of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act, at 1 1. Lee, supra note 1, at 214.
14. It would seem to contribute little to the usefulness of the treatise, for instance, to specu-
late that one of the reasons for the rising divorce rate may be that more "women have jobs outside
of the home... [and are] no longer dependent upon their husbands for economic support; con-
tacts with other men have been multiplied." I R. Lee, supra note 1, at 208.
15. "[C]onsider the plight of the young husband who is capable and anxious to have sexual
intercourse with a most attractive and sexually appealing wife, who might be as young as, or
younger than, he, and though fully capable is yet unwilling. In this... case the young man may
not have any legal remedy in North Carolina. ... Nevertheless, the law does not say that being
a man, he cannot take charge of the situation and do something himself. A husband cannot be
guilty of rape in forcibly having intercourse with his own wife." I R. Lee, supra note 1, at 130.
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